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Reality does not depend on the prior existence of human beings; rather, the point 
is to understand that ‘humans’ are themselves natural phenomena. 
Karen Barad (2007, 336) 
Even within the women's movement, we have had to fight and still do, for that very 
visibility which also renders us most vulnerable, our Blackness. For to survive in the 
mouth of this dragon we call america, we have had to learn this first and most vital 
lesson––that we were never meant to survive. Not as human beings. And neither 
were most of you here today, Black or not. And that visibility which makes us most 
vulnerable is that which is also the source of our greatest strength. Because the 
machine will try to grind you into dust anyway, whether or not we speak. We can sit 
in our corners mute forever while our sisters and ourselves are wasted, while our 
children are distorted and destroyed, while our earth is poisoned; we can sit in our 
safe corners mute as bottles, and we will still be no less afraid. 
Audre Lorde ([1977] 2017, 3–4) 
And I suppose that the saddest thing for me, thinking about the cover version that 
is Oranges, is that I wrote a story I could live with. The other one was too painful. I 
could not survive it. 
Jeanette Winterson (2012, 6) 
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I dance for a living. I have danced in some shape or form since I was born. I’ve danced before I 
could walk. This is evidenced by a home-video which pictures me dancing in diapers whilst holding 
on to the couch because, and you can see this clearly, I can barely stand on my own. 
I’ve earned my first salary dancing at the age of eight. My first job was in the show-dance circuit, I 
specialised in stage and television. I left this circuit after five years for what I perceived to be a lack 
of content. The general consent was that what you could do once, you did again, day in and day 
out, you were compensated and celebrated for your service, and that was that. In other words, 
that you could do something impressive reliably and on request was probably the reason why you 
were given another chance. And another. And another. Meanwhile, all the repetition didn’t mean 
that we were encouraged to engage with the form in the fashion of a martial art, or anything like 
that. The work was earning me money at an age when one is not expected to have access to 
anything more than a weekly allowance with which to buy a magazine and some gum and yet all I 
could think of was how cheap earning money in the context I was earning money in made me feel.  
At the age of thirteen I left the show-biz circuit and joined the youth dance program at the Zagreb 
Youth Theatre. I started learning about dance history, started dancing in theatre and dance 
performances for children and adults; my first role was in the 40-minute-long dance rendition of 
Mozart’s The Magic Flute choreographed by Desanka Virant. Following, I was playing characters 
and not, I was telling stories and not. I danced in original works and in repertory pieces. At the age 
of 15, I started training with Studio, Contemporary Dance Company. My first professional gig, later 
that same year, was in Matjaž Farič’s rendition of The Rite of Spring. That same Rite of Spring, I was 
learning, which in 1913 was said to have disturbed the Parisian audiences to the extent that was 
still worth talking about. That we were working on a historically relevant piece meant the world to 
me. 
Having found access to a continual influx of information, dancing started feeling purposeful again. 
In comparison to show, art felt investigative, negotiable, radical. In comparison to getting applause 
every time, mixed reactions felt relevant, asked for my attention, made me think twice about what 
I was doing: before and after I did it. This kind of investigative approach to working as a dancer 
made sense to me. It still does. 
At the age of seventeen I left my home country because, at the time, there was no higher education 
for dance and choreography in Croatia. People, professionals and non-professionals alike, asked 
why it was that I wanted to “go back to school.” I didn’t know how to respond to that question for I 
hadn’t had the feeling I was “going back.” If anything, I was going forwards, I was going north and I 
was going west, I was leaving home, I was looking for ever more information. I was driven by 
curiosity, a thirst for knowledge, and a thirst for experiencing. 
Dancing has always been the reason I made what other people called bold choices in life. 
Personally, however, I didn’t think much about any of it. I did what I had to do to learn as much as 
I could about this field I was navigating. I went where information could be found. Dancing being 
an oral tradition and a practical one, I went to where the people “who knew” were; where they 
lived, taught, and created. I left Croatia for Austria, where I spent two years studying at the Salzburg 
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Experimental Academy of Dance. I left Austria for Belgium, where I spent four years studying at the 
Performing Arts Research and Training Studios. I eventually moved to Sweden, where I still live and 
work. It is here that I took the Master Program in Fine Arts entitled New Performative Practices. 
After eight years studying dancing and choreography in prestigious dance schools, I decided that 
what I was studying was not so much dancing as it was studying dancing. This report draws heavily 
from my experience studying dancing in these schools. I also draw from my experience teaching 
dancing and working as a dancer in Croatia, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the US, Canada, and 
Aotearoa New Zealand since approximately 2005 until today. 
Years into traveling, dancing, making dancing, teaching dancing, studying dancing, and writing 
dancing, years into watching repertory and original work, participating in making of original work 
and studying of repertory, years into studying the European theatrical dance circuit, of both dance 
production and dance education, I started noticing patterns. What I thought was a radical art from, 
this art of embodiment of thought was, I was learning, mostly not radical at all. It was also mostly 
not studying embodiment, in the sense of the word I will attempt to argue for. For the largest part 
the art of stage and theatre dancing and making was and is, in fact, an artform of obedience. 
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Stockholm, 2017. 
When a 19 year old person came to the university I teach at to study dance performance and, upon 
being asked to share their opinion in front of class, started crying because of how stressed they were–
–having never before been asked to share their opinion in public––I got distracted from teaching, I
stopped the class. I stopped the class because: (1) I had to investigate: could it have been that a
dance school taught their students dance at high-school level in 2016 in silence; and (2) I had to
make sure this person’s personhood got acknowledged and––for once, perhaps––became a priority
before all else institutional, social, and politically correct.1
We stood together, in front of class, the person and I, hand in hand for minutes on end, until tears 
transformed into a soft giggle, and until they said––out loud, calmly, and in public––the word: “Soup.” 
Their peers followed in a procession, one by one they took the imagined spotlight to say random 
words. “Banana.” “Shoe.” “Airplane.” To growing comfort and growing confidence I responded by 
raising the stakes. Random words were followed by the word “artist,” then “I.” Then “I am.” “I am” 
was difficult, it raised a lot of questions. “I am?” We waited. Repeated. “I am?” transformed into “I 
am.” and was conquered. And then finally, after a couple of hours we were going to spend dancing, 
the person who inspired the becoming ritual took the spotlight and said––confidently and loudly, 
undoubtedly––the statement: “I AM AN ARTIST.” 
observation 
reflection 
speculation 
 265 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (2) (2020) 
reference 
experience 
document 
(n)  -ation 
Dance programs, by and large, do not prioritise theoretical and critical practices. If theory stands 
represented in the curriculum, rarely is any time scheduled for reading and writing. Reading and 
writing, as it were, are meant to be engaged with after hours, in the evenings or during the 
weekends: i.e., after the dancer has already spent a minimum of 40 hours a week engaged in self-
reflective physical labour. 
It is questionable, however, if the time for reading and writing is, in fact, considered by those 
responsible for putting curricula together. Because how do you argue the lack of scheduled time? 
Either by saying that students, whilst meant to develop a theoretical practice, are not actually 
meant to be able to do so within the framework of a 40-hour week? Or else by saying that the 
students are expected to engage a massive professional undertaking as private individuals, or else 
be expected to fail as professionals?  
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Meanwhile, most people who teach theory to dancers in my experience are professional academics 
who do not necessarily know what it’s like to be spending the majority of your scheduled time in 
the dance studio engaging in heavy physical labour. Most people who teach theory to dancers are 
people who’ve, in the process of studying theory, studied reading and writing, much in the same 
way dancers have, in the process of studying dancing, studied dancing: without having to explain 
what it takes to engage in the act of reading or dancing over an extended period of time, without 
having to make the practice interesting or accessible to someone who doesn’t already have the 
interest or the access. The practice of reading, as is the practice of dancing, is so discovered to be 
assumed to be self-evident and is discovered to be assumed to be something a student has already 
accomplished, so to speak, for how else did they manage to qualify to enter a BA program in the 
first place? For example. I wonder, however, if the tables were turned, would we expect students 
of philosophy to be able to dance in the way we expect students of dance to be able to read? 
In the context of studio practice in general dancers are mostly working in groups, are mostly 
learning by imitating (if not the teacher than the [over-romanticised aesthetic] dream) and are, 
crucially, mostly spoken to. Speaking, in general and coming from a dancer, is widely considered 
to be inappropriate in the context of a dance class. This is not evidenced only in a teacher’s 
behaviour, which I will not be bringing up as an example because I do not wish to, at present, 
problematise individual choice making. More importantly, then, I am interested in the fact that the 
inappropriateness of a dancer to speak in a dance class is evidenced in the general structure of a 
dance class, the flow of which is based on its uninterrupted ongoingness. Uninterrupted 
ongoingness is often what makes a class good, and a teacher who is able to maintain the status 
quo—a guru. 
Intra-action2.  
In that they are spoken to, dancers are given access to information. In that they are rarely asked 
to speak, their reflective process––assuming that they, indeed, engage in one––remains 
unwitnessed. I say “assuming that they, indeed, engage in one” not to question dancer’s capacities 
and/or interest in engaging in a reflective process, but rather to point out (1) that dancers are rarely 
given the opportunity to share their reflective process in public; and (2) that dancers are rarely 
given the opportunity to spend time reflecting in any documentable way. What you will often see 
is a teacher speaking to a dancer then immediately shifting attention to another dancer, in which 
case the first dancer carries off on their own; or else you will see a teacher speaking to a dancer 
then immediately asking the dancer to demonstrate in action that they’ve processed the 
information, in which case the dancer has no time to reflect on their own, no time to engage in a 
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process of trial and error, no time to study between the reception of information and the 
demonstration of its implementation. 
But even if a dancer is given the time to study, what remains is the following assumption: that 
whenever a dancer demonstrates that they’ve implemented given information––the teacher will 
be able to tell. A dance teacher may be able to perceive a dancer’s performance as knowledgeable 
in a specific way, no doubt about it. My point is the following: if there is no dialogue; if the dancer 
never speaks, i.e., reports on their internal process, and if the teacher never explains what of what 
they’ve seen, felt, intuited is informing their evaluation, then we not only risk not knowing that the 
dancer actually engaged in a reflective process (in which case we’re risking not acknowledging the 
dancer’s agential efforts), but we also risk not knowing what conclusions the teacher has come to, 
how they have come to them, and in order to achieve what purpose. We risk not exposing the 
thinking process in mediums other than the unspoken ones, and so fail to develop a shareable and 
teachable methodology. In other words, we risk not learning how to engage in a critical study of 
embodiment, and we risk not learning how to engage in a critical study of performativity––a study 
of that which is interlinked with yet separate from itself. 
The point, you could argue, is, of course, not that we are risking, but that we have, in fact, already 
risked. We have already created and embodied the culture of silence within the context of European 
dance making and teaching. 
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On Talent, the notion of 
I witness (repeatedly) the word “talent” used when describing the indescribable; when 
describing something that comes easy, looks effortless, and is perceived as virtuosic––all 
at the same time. I also witness the word talent used when the talent does one of the two: 
(1) doesn’t speak about itself publicly (unsurprisingly); or: (2) does speak about itself 
publicly, but in such a way that does little more than reproduce a stereotype, i.e., fits within 
the framework of the dominant narrative of how talent comes about and why its existence 
is admirable. 
Artists who speak and speak in complex ways about the work that they’re doing are often 
spoken about in reference to the words “experiment,” “activism,” and/or “research” art, but 
only if an “expanded” notion exists and “we” are familiar with it, such as “choreography as 
an expanded practice.” Artists and works of the sort are often assumed to be not 
interesting to the general population, or to be belonging to a niche. 
Notions like talent, I dare say, have, traditionally speaking, made it possible for skilled 
individuals to forgo developing a critical understanding of their skills. Notions like talent 
have also made it possible for people in power to make decisions without having to justify 
their process more than by saying that they recognised or did not recognise talent. Notions 
like talent have made it possible for teachers to favour students, for audiences to favour 
dancers or choreographers––without anyone being the wiser for it. 
Note: My aim is not to abolish talent, which has, like the word beauty, named wonderful 
things in the past. Instead, I’d like to see such a word examined on a cultural and a personal 
basis, I would like to see it used with more care, I would like to see it used with more 
purpose, and I would like to hear it defined more often. Yes, talent, but what does that 
word mean? When in use, why is it being used, specifically? 
The order described above is not only found in the educational environment. It is also found in the 
professional environment. The dancer-teacher dynamic is reflected in professional relationships 
established between dancers and rehearsal directors, dancers and artistic directors, and dancers 
and choreographers. The consequences of this order are innumerable. 
In my experience of navigating the European professional field of dance and choreography, a field 
that seems to think itself post-modern in every way imaginable, what I seem to be meeting is a 
culture and a tradition of knowledge production that, at least where I live and work still largely 
assumes, amongst other things, the dominance of the (Elightened) mind over the (sacrilegious) 
body. My goal with this essay is to account for some of the ways in which I think I recognise how 
this assumption has been institutionalised, and as such frames what is possible to perceive and 
argue as knowledge. I will also try to articulate why embodied practices are especially vulnerable 
within this context. 
* 
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In the Western tradition, a consensus-of-sorts has been made, historically speaking, due to which 
learning and consequently knowledge are assumed to be an objective process related to thinking, 
which, in turn, is commonly understood to be taking place in the thinking mind, i.e., to be a capacity 
of the central nervous system. Descartes, who is arguably the primary reason this consensus exists, 
banished thinking from all bodily systems that are not the brain, including all the capacities of the 
nervous system that are not oriented towards thought calibrated through language, when he said 
that he “decided to suppose that nothing was such as they [the senses] lead us to imagine to be” 
“because our senses sometimes deceive us” ([1637] 2006, 28). 
This is to argue that what Descartes did was not only to create the infamous split. He created a 
system that stigmatises any order of thought other than doubtful (objective) and documentable 
(written) thought (language). A system that, it is needless to argue, subordinates any and every 
system that is oral or non-verbal, that is possibly intuitive, any and every academically 
undocumented study, no matter its longevity or otherwise recognised credibility. Furthermore, and 
this in contradiction to what I am about to explore in this text, Descartes created the second brain, 
one that is not, in fact, an organ at all, but lives, as an actor, in language alone.  
Traditionally, in our culture, learning is considered to be a function of the nervous 
system. It is my experience that the nervous system is only one aspect of learning–
–that it is first a recording system and therefore the last system to “know.” It records 
and stores patterns of movement and behaviours and, once stored, it can retrieve 
them and thereby control experience through habit, memory, and projection. […] 
For new experience to be obtained, release of the nervous system control is 
necessary so that old habits are no longer directing the outcome and new cellular 
experience can come into being. (Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen 2012, 161) 
 
Embodied practice is epistemic. It is structured by and productive of knowledge. 
Accordingly, an epistemological account of embodied practice is one according to 
which such practice actively encounters and comes to know reality through 
technique, rather than simply producing or constructing it. Social epistemologies 
allow us to analyse the development and circulation of embodied knowledge––in 
the form of technique––through processes that are both socially enabled and 
materially engaged. (Ben Spatz 2015, 27) 
I turn to Body-Mind Centering®, the school of embodied anatomy initiated by Bonnie Bainbridge 
Cohen that takes an embodied approach to studying and affirms the person’s experience as the 
paradigm within which to think. The kind of pedagogy the school stands for prioritises––without 
deviation, I’d like to argue––the embodied understanding and builds a theoretical and critical 
knowledge upon it. Here is an example of a methodology that reverses the Cartesian paradigm, 
revolts its hierarchy of priorities, in practice as it starts from the body, and works its way to the 
brain, all the while questioning its assumed supremacy.  
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A student of Body-Mind Centering® studies always at their own pace, even when studying in a 
group. This means that the flow, the “uninterrupted ongoingness” a dance class will be celebrated 
for, is––depending how you choose to look at it––either non-existent in the context of a BMC® class 
or else exists but is defined by a set of parameters unimaginable from the point of view of a 
tradition whose primary focus is, perhaps, obedience. 
It is customary, in a BMC® class, for the class to be interrupted. It is customary for questions to 
arise, for people’s workflow to be interrupted, and for books to be put down. It is customary for 
the exercises to take more time than anticipated and it is customary for the teacher to be 
renegotiating their plans in real time. Meanwhile, you will frequently find a student of BMC® taking 
a nap in class or interrupting their day to write an entry in their journal or take a walk. This is the 
kind of behaviour, namely, a dance student might be disciplined and even expelled for. This is also 
the kind of behaviour that an adult who ordinarily subscribes to a normative lifestyle will find 
disturbing, or at least dissatisfyingly unfamiliar. In short, it’s the kind of behaviour that requires 
time for adjustment, it requires getting used to. It is one thing to know, after all, that napping is 
allowed when necessary. It is an entirely other thing for the individual to actually know themselves 
well enough to know when it’s time to take a nap, then take it; and for the community to embrace 
the presence of napping bodies within the educational context without having to justify, evaluate, 
or pass judgement. 
What this pedagogical methodology proposes is an educational order in which a group will never 
accomplish anything that isn’t first accomplished by all its members. It proposes a standard that 
reverses currently dominant evaluative criteria, as it denies the teacher the capacity to decide what 
the student is to perform without negotiation. Each step in this order is a matter of negotiation of 
each member of the group in relation to each other member, no matter their rank. 
calibration 
jurisdiction 
or how to reverse the mind-body split 
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In terms of Body-Mind Centering®––and I’m developing and reporting on my own understanding 
of the embodied knowledge I am tending to in the context of my ongoing study––every cell of the 
human body has “a mind of its own.” One way of understanding “the mind of a cell” is not 
metaphorical, but literal. Namely, every cell has a nucleus, and in that nucleus the information from 
which it recognises or draws its purpose. Were I opposed to personification, I could say the same 
thing differently: Every cell has a nucleus in which is stored the information that corresponds to or 
aligns with the cell’s function. I am, of course, at this instance talking about the programming, I am 
talking about the code, I am talking about the DNA. 
In that a cell has the information it needs to be able to know its purpose under its own jurisdiction–
–is how I started thinking about it––a cell is independent. It governs itself, and only reports to the 
central nervous system, which is, in turn, dependent on the input provided by cellular life external 
to itself. This implies a reversal of the dominant narrative by which the only experience of value is 
that had when the mind governs the body. 
The Central nervous system, contrary to the popular opinion, is not in charge. Its primary functions 
include, according to my understanding of BMC®, recording, organising, and storing. According to 
the Department of Molecular and Cell Biology at UC Berkeley’s online resource, the primary 
functions of the central nervous system are “integrating the sensory information and directing any 
necessary response.” 
Experiencing, by which I mean gathering of new information, happens where body and 
environment meet. In that it happens through interaction, experiencing happens through sensory 
perception, which means that it necessarily happens at a cellular level. According to UC Berkeley’s 
online resource, “afferent or sensory neurons collect stimuli received by receptors throughout the 
body, including the skin, eyes, ears, nose, tongue as well as pain and other receptors in the internal 
organs.” In that experiencing of the world happens at a cellular level, the experiencing of the world 
happens, and this is a very important point for me to make, outside of the jurisdiction of the nervous 
system. More importantly, the experiencing of the world happens “outside” of the jurisdiction of 
that bodily system that we’ve, culturally speaking, learned to associate with control and… identity, 
I suppose, is what’s at stake here, isn’t it? The other implication here is that to learn something new 
one, quite literally, needs not to rely on the capacities of the Cartesian mind––which is, without the 
interference of the interactive thus sacrilegious body, as it’s suggested here, confined to the world 
of information that was collected sometime in the past, possibly under uncontrolled circumstances 
(what about: bias). 
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A cell, any cell, may be sensitive to the 
nervous system. A cell might also be 
sensitive to its cluster. A cell might also 
be sensitive to its cluster only, and it 
could be that it’s the cluster, but not the 
cell itself, that is sensitive to the nervous 
system.  
Wherever there’s a cell sensitive to a cell, 
a cluster, or the nervous system, the 
nervous system, a cluster, or a cell is, in 
turn, sensitive to the cell. 
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This is my first attempt at approaching the notion of agency as a practice. I am looking for a way 
of releasing bodily capacities from the jurisdiction of the mind, as understood within European 
paradigms. I start by affirming the mind-body split as most people I have the chance to work with 
and teach exhibit in one way or another proof of the fact they’ve embodied the concept. All the 
while, I am considering philosophical texts, anatomical texts, and (science) fiction; I am taking 
into account my bodily experience, I am dancing and I am writing, I am teaching, conversing, 
occasionally making progress, occasionally falling back on old habits, making unnecessary 
assumptions, and failing. My strategy includes not trying to fix anything but to study every step I 
am taking; every achievement, every set-back. I assume my learning curve to be cyclical, as I 
continue to practice in public, always vulnerable but available to receiving feedback. 
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A possible consequence of thinking one cell a complete living organism is thinking all cells as 
complete living organisms is thinking human as a conglomerate made up of trillions of living 
organisms. A possible consequence of thinking one cell a complete living organism is thinking 
human as a conglomerate made up of trillions of living organisms whose lifespans are, in most 
cases, significantly shorter than the human’s; organisms that are born and that die how many times 
during a human life cycle––much to the human’s personal satisfaction, right? A possible 
consequence of thinking one cell a complete living organism is thinking human a result of labour 
the human needs not be aware of even, even though every decision the human makes for 
themselves has an immediate effect on the conditions that govern cellular life, as cells depend on 
the human breathing, eating, sleeping for all kinds of reasons, including nourishment––all of which, 
the breathing, the eating, the sleeping, the human, in turn, needs to be able to afford.  
I am talking politics here. I am talking about an opportunity to think global politics on the scale 
of a single human individual. To do this, I don’t even need to develop a metaphor. I only need to 
study anatomy, is my proposal. And not just study, objectively speaking, but study, subjectively 
speaking. 
Meanwhile, humans, in their blissful state of ignorance, assume life as a given, and death as 
something to avoid––both experientially and in conversation––the consequences of which are, at 
least partially, devastating. But I digress. 
Karen Barad, in Meeting the Universe Halfway, offers an invaluable contribution to this thought 
process contained within the definition of intra-action. Intra-action “recognises that distinct 
agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action” (Barad 2007, 33). 
Interaction, in comparison, “assumes the prior existence of distinct entities” (197). Two significant 
details. One is temporal. The idea that, let’s call it an entity, cannot know itself until it intra-acts with 
another entity. To know itself, an entity needs a context within which to recognise its significance. 
To know itself, an entity needs feedback. The knowing of itself, ergo does not emerge through division 
(doubt). Instead, it emerges through amalgamation. 
The second is relational. The idea that meaning––value, purpose, you name it––emerges from 
intra-action. For meaning to emerge though intra-action, amalgamation, then, meaning must 
always emerge in hindsight.  
Imagine the consequences of (not just) 
thinking intra-action instead of 
interaction between world and body, 
 275 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (2) (2020) 
body and body, cell and cluster and 
peripheral nervous system. Imagine 
intra-action at every point of contact 
touched upon earlier in the text.  
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In other words. 
Always. 
In other words. 
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performativity 
As a child I was taught to think of myself as weird and to expect my behaviour to be frowned upon. 
As a young teenager, I was taught to identify myself as flamboyant. My behaviour was decidedly 
girly, and obviously inappropriate for a boy (the 00s). Later on, I was taught to identify myself as a 
gay man (if I was lucky). I say “I was taught to think of myself as” because prior to having the 
experiences I am calling upon here I didn’t relate to any of those terms; I didn’t know that there is 
such a thing as “weird,” or “flamboyant,” or “gay.” I didn’t even know that sex and gender must be 
unnegotiably linked to one another. When I’m lucky these days, I am identified as a queer by some 
communities. A bisexual pansexual polyamorist and activist by others.  
I stepped into this world and felt “wow, you can paint cartilage with colour,” or “wow, there’s a 
person that’s really nice and attractive.” It never occurred to me, until I received feedback, that 
there was “meaning” in these things. As I start from the point of naïveté and am being taught into 
a system that is unforgiving. 
[…] words […] made me realise something about 
intuition: that when something makes sense 
intuitively, especially at an early age, one can 
afford to not develop a critical understanding of 
whatever that thing that makes sense is. which 
is not noticeable, if what makes sense intuitively 
is the same thing that makes sense intuitively to 
most people around you. 
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growing up queer, the way i learned that my 
intuitive understanding was “out of tune,” 
culturally speaking, was through violence: i 
found myself bullied, made fun of, told that the 
things that made sense to me “made no sense,” 
that i should sort myself out, stop 
philosophising, making things complicated that 
supposedly aren’t, that i should grow up or grow 
out of it. and so i started to develop a critical 
understanding of things i never considered 
thinking critically about or studying because i 
needed to survive, and because i needed to 
convince myself that i was not crazy. 
by learning words and what they stand for, you 
learn that a discourse exists, that language 
exists, and by using (speaking) those words you 
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learn that communities exist. by speaking about 
things that make sense you learn that you’re not 
alone. 
which, mind you, is not a principle that works 
for liberal feminists and queers alone. but that 
is another story for another time. 
in closing, i have to acknowledge the effort 
invested in inspiring members of the privileged 
majority to become critically aware of the things 
they never perhaps had to think about because 
those things never made them vulnerable, never 
isolated them socially. never put them on the 
spot. 
the value of critical thinking, as i understanding 
it at the moment, is preventative: it prevents one 
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from jumping to conclusions, from trusting 
assumption instead of evidence. and this goes 
to all people interested in relationships: catch 
yourself making assumptions instead of asking 
questions and work against that urge. teach 
yourself how to ask your partner questions! be 
interested in them. remember that they are a 
person, too. and when receiving answers, be 
brave. listen. digest.  
and take. your. time. 
/// i love you. end of rant. (pavleheidler 2019a) 
I come into the spotlight as a dancer and … where do I begin?3 In the history of thought that I was 
educated in, I come on stage as a dancer to dominate the audience. (Much in the same way as to 
dance is to dominate the body, to be in control of the body.)  
This is a colonial principle, isn’t it, to assume that you not only can, but ought to come in and 
claim the space of the theatre as yours, that you ought to deliver and make everybody comply 
to your supposed talent and artistic genius. This principle is normalised, unionised even. Critics 
and spectators expect it to take place. Critics and spectators complain if it doesn’t. They 
marginalise forms that don’t comply by this principle as “research,” and “experiment,” and “I 
don’t understand, it must have no value,” and “is it even art.”  
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At the same time, as my research is becoming more palpable to me, I am beginning to realise that 
I come on stage––after all these years––only to shit my pants. STAGE FRIGHT, right? I start feeling 
bad about it, I start trying to eliminate it, because that’s what one does, isn’t it? Except that then I 
start reading, and thinking, and soon come up with the following proposal. What if stage fright isn’t, 
in fact, the fright of performing? What if I am shitting my pants because I am starting to realise that 
all these people I am standing before are, in fact, people. Social animals who have a mind of their 
own, who have a history of their own, who have experience of their own. What if I feel 
uncomfortable because I was used to ignoring this realisation, because I was used to disrespecting 
the spectator’s agential potential by treating them as a manipulatable generic member of the 
public. What if that’s not the kind of politic I wish to embody anymore? 
 
 
 
Through being gendered I started understanding 
something about performing, which is that so much of 
performance is not in my hands, as a performer. So 
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much of performance is actually and literally in the 
gaze of those who are gazing at. 
 
What can I do about that? 
What can I do about any of that? 
What can I do, as an individual? 
What can I do about the institutionalised history of oppressive practices that teaches  
me to be silent? That actively avoids teaching me how to speak? 
 
science- 
fiction 
A series of circumstances put me in a situation which asked of me to address touch in my teaching. 
I’ve never before taught touch. In fact, most of my teaching by this point avoided touch at all costs. 
Touch is difficult for me, as it is difficult for every person who doesn’t find touching and being 
touched intuitively easy. Meanwhile, there is little space in the professional context of dance and 
dance training that allows for the study of touch, that provides a slow approach to touch, and that 
encourages negotiation. Dancing is a culture that assumes touch, assumes everyone has an easy 
time touching and being touched, assumes that everyone wants to be touched, at all times, and 
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for no explicit reason. Dancing is a culture that assumes that some things cannot be communicated 
except through touch. Dancing is a culture that doesn’t necessarily have patience for those who 
put touch into question. 
The class I developed for the occasion—and have been working on since—defines a practice that 
was going to be radically anti-colonial in its approach to consent. We practice asking for permission 
before touching every single time, we practice touching without ulterior motive, and without a 
previously prescribed agenda. We touch for the sake of study and are sensitive to what we learn 
from touching and being touched. We create the conditions for not-assuming touching. We wait, if 
needed. We negotiate: we ask questions and act according to the information we receive with the 
answers. And most importantly, we take the risk of never arriving at touching at all. I would like this 
record to show that we were going to practice methodologies I anticipated dancers to be well 
versed in. My plan was to do little more than remind participants of what they already knew. 
It didn’t take long for most participants, a lot of whom identified as highly sensitive and/or queer, 
to discover they tended to touch to manipulate. As long as the purpose of touching was to do, as 
long as touching was engaged in “with purpose,” and as long as the person touching was in charge: 
the room was calm. But those techniques or habits were, of course, exactly the ones we set out to 
challenge. 
What continues to surprise me is just how deeply challenging this work is turning out to be for the 
practitioner; how deeply moved persons will find themselves to be when they find themselves 
challenged at the level, so to speak, of assumption. When they find themselves conscious of the 
way and the speed in which their thinking conditions their doing.  
When awakened, however temporarily, 
to powerlessness: will, or mind, can feel 
into the time before the condition of the 
body emerges (is remembered). It is then 
that one can imagine how much willed, 
and mind-full labour might be necessary 
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for the re-conditioning of not just habit, 
but the physical condition at large. 
It seems to me that when one starts exercising the will, the mind, or the I in fact, that internalised 
entity that speaks as I, one discovers that this I is a mobile thing that can manifest in the body in 
different ways, one discovers that this I can speak and stay quiet, i.e., that it can manifest through 
language or sensation. I speculate when I say that the discovery of the I as dynamic and as sensitive 
to the condition that makes it is provocative of discomfort. Because people, and here I am reporting 
on a pattern I am recognising, run the risk of losing their sense of self when they acknowledge that 
they are more than the assumed singular. More than that learned sense of I––stable—am moving 
things in this life––unstable––, right? I—stable––am in charge––of everything unstable, i.e., life on Earth. 
I think that the acknowledgement of this discomfort begins the process of actually learning how to 
think. In which case by thinking I am addressing an embodied experience. An experience that takes 
fantasy to be a part of daily life and takes it seriously. And starts treating it with, I don’t want to say 
respect, but as if it has agency, as if it has a voice, as if it has a stake in reality, and as if it’s something 
that you are in dialogue with. Which it does. And you are. As far as I’m concerned. 
I say fantasy because I do not know of a better way to frame at the moment what it is that I am 
going on about. What I do know is that I am not talking about a therapeutic process per se. I am 
not talking about efforts that are interested in being recognised as psychology, psychiatry, 
neurology, medical anatomy, or medicine in general. I am talking about an inquiry into critical 
thinking, where thinking is embodied; an inquiry that cannot not take sensing and feeling into 
account. An inquiry that cannot not take chaos as its structural element. An inquiry that cannot not 
benefit from crying in public, that cannot not disrupt the order of comfort. An inquiry that cannot 
not challenge the assumed measure of appropriateness, and in some cases: the temporary and 
culturally specific measure of sanity. 
The reason I am interested in engaging with this practice is for the potential consequence with 
which it might merit its practitioners. To go back to the example of performing: how can I dominate 
someone else, in this case, the audience, if I cannot dominate myself to begin with? Or the other 
way around, how does my experience of me being more than one complexify my understanding of 
what it means to work with an audience, to work with the public, to work with people? And how do 
I learn to start working with this, in a world in which an employee is rarely if ever paid to be engaged 
in a personal study as well as be engaged with labour the employer is to directly benefit from? How 
do I start working with this, when speaking up is recognised as rebellious, unproductive, and 
assumed to be threatening––when creativity, and authorship is reserved for those who inhabit the 
higher places in the food chain?  
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An example of an exercise: 
When working on touch, I will often 
train my will, my mind, the speaking I, 
to withdraw from the space of the 
hand and so let the hand perceive in 
its own right. 
When working on touch, I (remember: 
capacity of the central nervous 
system) will often train my will, my 
mind, the speaking I, to withdraw from 
the space of the hand (remember: the 
capacity of cellular life) and so let the 
hand perceive in its own right. 
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The challenge is then in the question: 
how does my process change given 
the circumstances of the exercise? 
How does entertaining this or a 
similar scenario change my place in 
the politic of how I relate to other 
materials in and of this Universe?  
It is an ever-so-slightly humbling 
experience, to take your-self as selves 
seriously. It awakens us to the fact 
that wherever we’re found at the 
moment of consciousness is… real.  
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An example of a poem discovered 
during exercise: 
We are an amalgamation of what can 
and cannot be known consciously, 
cognitively at any one time. We act, 
and in action engage the world in a 
relationship we are and cannot 
necessarily be in control of at the 
same time. We can only ever be 
partially obedient. Digestion is also 
always at work. It has a life of its own. 
We have a life of our own. We are and 
is me and we are and is not. We are 
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and is of me, and we are and is not; 
and I am of we, and I am not. OR am 
I? Are we? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://vimeo.com/338119358  (pavleheidler 2019b) 
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just  
because you 
don’t 
understand it 
doesn’t  
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mean it  
doesn’t  
exist       
1 “The histories that bring us to feminism are the histories that leave us fragile” (Ahmed 2017, 22). 
2 “Intra-actions are nonarbitrary, nondeterministic causal enactments through which matter-in-the-process-of-
becoming is iteratively enfolded into its ongoing differential materialisation. Such a dynamics is not marked by an 
exterior parameter called time, nor does it take place in a container called space. Rather, iterative intra-actions 
are the dynamics through which temporality and spatiality are produced and iteratively reconfigured in the 
materialisation of phenomena and the (re)making of material-discursive boundaries and their constitutive 
exclusions” (Barad 2007, 179). 
3 “Discursive practices are the material conditions for making meaning. In my [Karen Barad’s] posthumanist 
account, meaning is not a human-based notion; rather, meaning is an ongoing performance of the world in its 
differential intelligibility. Intelligibility is usually framed as a matter of intellection and therefore a specifically human 
capacity. But in my agential realist account, intelligibility is a matter of differential responsiveness, as performatively 
articulated and accountable, to what matters. Intelligibility is not an inherent characteristic of humans but a feature 
of the world in its differential becoming. The world articulates itself differently” (Barad 2007, 335). 
Notes 
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